This paper investigates whether individuals feel worse off when others around them earn more. In other words, do people care about relative position and does "lagging behind the Joneses" diminish well-being? To answer this question, I match individual-level panel data containing a number of indicators of well-being to information about local average earnings. I find that, controlling for an individual's own income, higher earnings of neighbors are associated with lower levels of self-reported happiness. The data's panel nature and rich set of measures of well-being and behavior indicate that this association is not driven by selection or by changes in the way people define happiness. There is suggestive evidence that the negative effect of increases in neighbors' earnings on own well-being is most likely caused by interpersonal preferences, i.e. people having utility functions that depend on relative consumption in addition to absolute consumption.
Introduction
Classical economists understood that individuals are motivated at least partly by concerns about relative position. Adam Smith (1759) Commandments apparently judged it necessary to forbid humans from coveting their neighbor's possessions. Not all humans, however, appear to abide by this Commandment and possible effects of social comparisons on consumption and savings behavior are analyzed in the classic works of Veblen (1899) and Duesenberry (1949) .
Though contemporary economists are aware that individuals may care about relative position, the accepted mainstream model states that individuals derive utility from their own consumption, U(C), rather than from a combination of own and relative consumption, U(C, C/ C ), where C denotes some measure of the consumption of relevant others. 2 For many applications it does not matter whether utility has a relative component; whenever C is fixed or given, U(C) and U(C, C/ C ) are isomorphic. Indeed, unless an individual's behavior can affect C , U(C) and U(C, C/ C ) cannot be distinguished by individual behavior without placing additional structure on the utility function. 3 In light of this, it is perhaps not surprising that most economists tend to rely on an absolute formulation of utility: U(C).
1 This is quoted in Graham and Pettinato (2002) . 2 Becker (1974) introduces a more general framework for incorporating social considerations into a utility function.
C need not be the simple average of the consumption of relevant others, but could be some weighted average with the weight depending on the similarity of the respondent to the other person or on the level of consumption of the other person. 3 A structure that specifies that relative concerns are more important for some goods (e.g. present consumption or luxury consumption items) than for other goods (e.g. leisure or future consumption) yields behavioral implications. See, for example, Pollak (1976) or Frank (1985) . As Dupor and Liu (2003) make clear, if the consumption of others affects own marginal utility rather the level of own utility, the consumption of others can influence asset pricing, risk taking, savings, intensity of job search, work effort, economic growth and income inequality. See, e.g., Abel (1990) , Robson (1992) , Galí (1994) , Carroll, Overland and Weil (1997) , Campbell and Cochrane (1999) , Becker, Murphy and Werning (2003) , Zeckhauser and Rizzo (2003) and Stutzer and Lalive (2004) .
Whereas individuals may in many cases take C as given, policy decisions often affect C . Hence, the distinction between absolute and relative formulations of utility has important implications for tax and expenditure policy, as analyzed by Boskin and Sheshinski (1978) , Layard (1980) , Oswald (1983) , Ng (1987) , Seidman (1987) , Ireland (1998) , Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000) and Abel (2003) . In particular, if utility depends on relative consumption, one person's increase in consumption has a negative externality on others because it lowers the relative consumption of others. In this case, taxes that discourage consumption are not as distortionary as previously thought because they also serve to internalize the negative externality of consumption on others.
When utility depends on one's consumption relative to nearby others, residential sorting by consumption level will reduce inequality of utility because people will compare themselves with others more like themselves. Comparing oneself to similar others reduces inequality in perceived relative position, which is one component of inequality of utility. If utility is linear in relative consumption and additive in absolute and relative consumption, then residential sorting by consumption level does not affect average utility, but for other functional forms it can increase or decrease average utility. Thus, when people care about relative position, the degree of residential sorting has direct effects on the distribution of well-being in addition to the indirect effects usually identified (e.g. due to the financing of local public goods).
The distinction between relative and absolute formulations of utility is also pertinent to the longstanding debate on whether the poverty line should be absolute (a fixed consumption basket), as it is in the U.S. and in many developing countries, or relative (a fraction of mean or median income), as it is in much of Europe (Sen, 1983) . It also matters for the question whether increases in inequality due to a rise in the top incomes are a matter of policy concern. Feldstein (1998), for example, argues forcefully that only poverty, not increases in inequality due to increased top incomes, warrant policy attention because the latter is a pure Pareto improvement under the assumption that people only derive utility from their own consumption. He notes that this argument would not hold for "spiteful egalitarians," or people who say "It makes me worse off to see the rich getting richer." While one may reject spiteful egalitarianism on moral grounds (and therefore use a paternalistic argument to exclude this spiteful utility component from any social welfare function), it is an empirical question to determine whether people actually suffer This paper builds on previous papers that have empirically examined the relationship between relative position and well-being. 6 In a series of papers, Easterlin (1974 Easterlin ( , 1995 Easterlin ( and 2001 notes that income and self-reported happiness are positively correlated across individuals within a country but that average happiness within countries does not seem to rise over time as countries become richer. Easterlin interprets these findings as evidence that relative income rather than the 4 Samuelson (2004) and Rayo and Becker (2004) offer evolutionary explanations of relative consumption effects. Postewaite (1998) discusses the advantages and drawbacks of modeling relative position as an argument of the utility function rather than as an instrument to getting more own consumption in the future. 5 Though, at a conceptual level, relative consumption rather than relative income or earnings affects well-being, I use measures of earnings and income as proxies for consumption in the empirical section because of data availability. 6 Frey and Stutzer (2002) provide an excellent review of this literature. Layard (2003) also discusses much of this literature as part of his engaging Lionel Robbins Memorial Lectures on happiness. Relative position may affect outcome variables other than subjective well-being. Clark and Oswald (1996) show evidence on job satisfaction while Neumark and Postlewaite (1998) and Bowles and Park (2002) relate it to labor supply decisions. There is a long literature on the effects of inequality on health outcomes. Deaton (2003) surveys this literature and concludes that the evidence on the relation between income inequality and health needs to be treated skeptically though he believes there is convincing biological evidence that increases in rank can be protective of health. Eibner and Evans (2001) find evidence for the U.S. that relative deprivation (which is a measure of rank and the income gap with those who are richer) increases mortality. Similarly, local variables other than income may affect well-being. Clark (2003) finds effects of local unemployment on happiness that may be explained by concerns about relative position. Alesina, Di Tella and MacCulloch (2001) investigate how inequality affects well-being and, intriguingly, find negative effects in Europe but not in the U.S.
level of income matters for well-being. Veenhoven (1991) and Diener et al. (1993) show that happiness is not purely a relative concept, but they cannot rule out that concerns about relative position matter. Van de Stadt, Kapteyn and Van de Geer (1985) find that the income level that respondents say they need to reach a certain level of satisfaction rises both with own income and with income in one's reference group as defined by education and age. They interpret this as evidence that utility is (partly) relative, but the findings could also be driven by reference group income proxying for poorly measured own income. 7 Using a self-reported measure of relative position, Graham and Pettinato (2002) find suggestive evidence in developing countries that well-being is influenced by relative income concerns though their measure of relative position might also proxy for own income.
Using Canadian data, Tomes (1986) relates self-reported happiness and life-satisfaction to own income and income in the local community. In a number of specifications, he finds that increases in income in certain parts of the community income distribution reduce well-being and he concludes that his "results support the interdependent preferences model, but defy any simple characterization in terms of inequality aversion or relative economic status." Using the German Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2004) finds compelling evidence that, controlling for own income, subjective well-being is decreasing in income of the reference group defined by education × age × region cells where region is East or West Germany. Stutzer (2004) shows that self-reported happiness of Swiss individuals depends negatively on income aspirations when own income is held constant. Income aspirations, in turn, depend positively on the average income in one's community, thus providing a mechanism by which average local income reduces self-reported happiness. Using U.S. data, McBride (2001) and Oswald and Clark (2004) both find tantalizing evidence that relative income affects subjective well-being but they caution about the statistical reliability of their findings. 7 Van Praag and Kapteyn (1973) found previously that income needed to reach a certain level of satisfaction rises with own income and interpret this as "preference drift," or evidence of habit formation. See Van Praag and Frijters (1999) for more details on the approach to measuring welfare using income need questions. 8 Using a sample of 324 individuals from the General Social Survey, McBride (2001) finds that, controlling for own income, self-reported happiness depends negatively on the average income in one's age cohort defined as those within 5 years of the respondent's age though this effect is only just significant at the 5% level in one of his two specifications and not significant in the other. Oswald and Clark (2004) find that, controlling for own income, there is a sizeable but statistically insignificant negative effect of per capita state income on self-reported happiness, providing suggestive evidence that individuals care about relative position. They also find that relative income enters significantly if entered as household income per capita / state income per capita. However, because this regression controls for the log of household income per capita rather than the level of household income per capita, This paper contributes in three ways to this literature. First, it takes seriously the concern that living in a prosperous area might affect one's definition of happiness even if it does not affect one's true or experienced well-being. I use other outcome measures that are less prone to definition shifts in response to neighbors' earnings to investigate this concern and conclude that this concern is not driving the results.
Second, the paper examines whether the inverse relationship between happiness and neighbors' earnings might be spurious due to omitted individual or local characteristics. The panel nature of the NSFH data enables me to run specifications with individual fixed effects, its detailed geographical information allows for the inclusion of state×time-specific fixed effects, and the use of a predicted measure of local earnings filters out many local earnings shocks caused by unobserved local factors that might simultaneously influence happiness. The results hold up under these specifications, reducing the concern that they are due to omitted variable bias.
Third, the paper offers suggestive evidence concerning the mechanism mediating the negative relationship neighbors' earnings and happiness. Is it a psychological externality of the form U(C, C/ C ) as laid out above? Or might there be market interactions (e.g. in the housing market) that give rise to this pattern? In contrast to what one would expect if the findings were driven by effects in local housing markets, I find no evidence that there is any difference in the effect for renters and owners. Yet, I do find evidence that the results are stronger for people who socialize more with neighbors but not for those who socialize more with friends outside the neighborhood. I also find that the effects on happiness are mostly driven by changes in one's satisfaction with one's material position (e.g. one's financial situation) rather than changes with one's satisfaction with other aspects of life (e.g. one's family life). Finally, individuals' happiness decreases if neighbors with the same educational attainment earn more but hardly responds to earnings of neighbors with different levels of educational attainment. Together, these findings indicate that interpersonal preferences that incorporate relative income concerns, rather than other mechanisms, drive the negative association between neighbors' earnings and own well-being.
the relative income term may be significant because it offers an alternative functional form for own household income and not because of variation in state income per capita.
Empirical Strategy
Can data on behavior reveal whether people's well-being is affected by the incomes of others around them? Unless one assumes that neighbors' incomes affect an individual's marginal utility of other goods, the only behavior affected is the individual's choice of reference group implicit in the decision where to locate. The identification of relative income concerns therefore probably falls in the limited set of research questions for which one needs to turn to a proxy for utility to answer it (see, Di Tella 9 See, Falk and Knell (2003) for evidence on reference groups choices from a questionnaire study. 10 This prediction is derived from Frank's (1984) model in which he analyzes the effects of relative income concerns on wage distributions. He assumes that the reference group consists of coworkers and deduces that a worker in firm with highly productive (and highly paid) workers must be paid more than a similar worker in a low productivity firm because the worker needs to be compensated for the utility loss of being a relatively low earner if he joins the firm with the high earners. , Gruber and Mullainathan, 2002 , or Frey et al., 2004 , for other examples of such questions). 11 Though some skepticism towards self-reported measures of well-being is warranted (see, Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001, and Ravallion and Lokshin, 2001) , there is ample psychological evidence that confirms the validity and reliability of self-reported happiness as a measure of well-being (see, e.g. Kahneman, 1999) . Frey and Stutzer (2002) therefore conclude that "the existing research suggests that, for many purposes, happiness or reported subjective well-being is a satisfactory empirical approximation to individual utility"
To determine whether well-being depends partly on relative income concerns, one might then estimate an equation of the form:
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(1) self-reported well-being = f(own income, average income in locality, controls)
To make the discussion of the empirical strategy more concrete, a very basic linear OLS regression with self-reported happiness (on a 1-7 scale) as the outcome variable yields a coefficient of 0.20 (s.e. of 0.014) on log own household income and a coefficient of -0.20 (s.e. of 0.04) on log average per capita income in one's locality (PUMA). 13 This regression previews the general findings of the more elaborate regressions presented in detail in the results section below.
Can this finding of a negative coefficient on average income in locality (and a positive one on own income) be interpreted as evidence that utility is at least partly determined by relative income? Or are there plausible alternative stories that could give rise to the same result even if utility is purely a function of own income? Below, I discuss the three most serious threats to a causal interpretation of the coefficient on average income in locality and consider ways of testing them.
The first alternative story is that the definition of happiness shifts: people answer the question about their happiness in relative rather than absolute terms (Tversky and Griffin, 1991, 11 Zeckhauser (1991) , Solnick and Hemenway (1998) and Johansson-Stenman (2002) find evidence for positional concerns by asking subjects to make choices over hypothetic scenarios with different levels of absolute and relative income. 12 I enter average income in locality separately in this specification rather than in form of the ratio of own income to average income in locality. I do this because, in practice, I have a number of proxies for own income instead of a single measure. 13 For simplicity, no other controls are included in this illustrative regression. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the PUMA level.
and Frederick and Loewenstein, 1999 expect to see different effects by homeownership and by presence of children in the household.
The third story is that the results are driven by omitted individual characteristics that influence both the decision where to live and self-reported happiness. In particular, selection of individuals with unobservables that make them relatively happy (or relatively likely to report being happy) into localities with relatively low incomes would also result in a negative coefficient on average income in locality. Though one might expect that most selection would go in the opposite direction (high income in one's locality proxying for higher unobserved own income), there could be selection effects that lead to a spurious negative effect of average income in locality. For example, individuals receiving an inheritance may be relatively unhappy (because of the unobserved death of a relative) but able to move to a relatively high-income locality, or intrinsically happy people might be better able to deal with the rougher aspects of low-income areas thus selecting to live there. This paper exploits the panel aspect of the NSFH data to deal with this concern. If, after inclusion of individual fixed effects, average income in the locality still matters, then we know that time-invariant unobserved individual characteristics cannot be driving the results.
To preserve statistical power, the baseline specification to test for relative income concerns is a pooled cross-section OLS regression of the form:
where i indexes individuals, p indexes PUMAs, and t indexes the wave of the survey. In the baseline specification, Happiness is self-reported happiness (measured on a seven-point scale), but other correlates of well-being are used in alternative specifications. LnPumaEarnings are average predicted earnings in the PUMA of the respondent where the prediction is based on the PUMA's industry×occupation composition and national earnings trends. The vector X it is a set of individual-specific controls that include a number of proxies for income as well as basic demographics. Finally, wave t is a dummy for the wave of the survey and ε ipt is an error term that may be clustered within PUMAs. If individuals derive utility in part from relative position, we would expect β 1 to be negative.
The baseline sample consists of individuals who are married or cohabitating in both waves of the NSFH. I limit the sample to married or cohabiting individuals for two reasons.
First, for these observations, we also have information about spouses or interactions with one's spouse, which are useful in a number of further tests of the baseline results. Second, it turns out that married individuals drive the baseline results, though neighbors' earnings still have a negative and significant effect on happiness in the full sample that includes non-married individuals.
Since most questions are asked of both the main respondent and his or her spouse, it makes sense to also exploit the spousal information. Adding the spousal information as a separate observation to the regression may bias standard errors downwards because the error term of the respondent and the error term of his or her spouse are likely to be correlated.
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Instead, I average the values of the individual level variables for the main respondent and his or her spouse, and enter those as a single observation in the regression. I thus do not exploit intrahousehold level variation, but this does not matter since the main explanatory variables of interest (neighbors' earnings and own household income) do not vary within households.
In the results section, I will present various modifications of this baseline regression to investigate whether the baseline results are spurious, whether they are robust, and what mechanisms drive them. These modifications will be explained in detail later and include adding individual fixed effects, adding state×wave fixed effects, exploring other outcome or control variables, and interacting LnPumaEarnings with other variables.
Data

National Survey of Families and Households
The data on subjective well-being as well as the individual-level control variables come from the National Survey of Families and Households. 19 The NSFH consists of a nationally The NSFH is a survey that was primarily designed for demographers interested in family and household issues. More information on the NSFH can be found in Sweet, Bumpass and Call (1988) , in Sweet and Bumpass (1996) The individual-level controls in the baseline specification consist of income proxies, labor market variables, demographic characteristics and religious affiliation. The main income variable is log household income while log value of the home and a dummy for being a renter may also proxy for own income. Any missing values are dummied out as are logarithms of any dollar amounts smaller than $100/year. 20 The demographic controls consist of gender, a set of 4 race/ethnicity dummies, log household size, and a 3-segment spline in age (breakpoints at 35 and 60). Religious affiliation is controlled for by 12 dummy variables.
Census and Current Population Survey
The smallest geographical area in the 1990 Census 5% Public Use Micro Sample (PUMS) is the so-called Public Use Microdata Area. PUMAs consist of neighborhoods, towns or counties aggregated up, or subdivided, until they contain at least 100,000 inhabitants. In 1990, there were 1726 PUMAs in the U.S. and the median and mean size of a PUMA was respectively 127,000 and 144,000 inhabitants. The 1990 Census microdata are used to estimate the 3-digit industry × 3-digit occupation composition of each PUMA, which is later used to predict PUMA earnings. In addition, I use the Census to estimate average 1989 earnings for each PUMA, which will serve as a check on the predictor. 
Results
Basic results
Column 1 of Table 1 shows the baseline specification in full. This is a pooled crosssection OLS regression of self-reported happiness on log predicted PUMA earnings and individual controls. Individual level variables in this regression are averages of the main respondent and his or her spouse. Standard errors are corrected for clustered error terms at the PUMA level and the sample includes all NSFH respondents who are married or cohabiting in both waves. The first row shows that, controlling for own income and other own characteristics, predicted PUMA earnings have a significantly negative effect on self-reported happiness. In other words, individuals with richer neighbors report being less happy. As expected, own household income has a positive effect on happiness but its coefficient may be relatively small because the regression includes other proxies for income, such as the value of one's home and a dummy variable for renting. 21 Usual working hours has an insignificant negative effect, unemployment status has a large and significant negative effect while a dummy for being out of the labor force has a significant positive effect on happiness. 22 The other demographic controls yield few surprising insights.
Column 2 shows the same regression using only data from the main respondent rather than averaging the respondent's data with that of the spouse. This regression confirms that the results are not sensitive to the averaging procedure used in the baseline regression though power increases moderately when the data of the main respondent and the spouse are averaged.
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The coefficient on own household income in the baseline regression is likely biased downwards due to measurement error in income and the inclusion of other income proxies. In 21 Ln Value of home has been demeaned. Hence, the dummy for renter is relative to a homeowner with a home of average value. 22 Ln Usual working hours has been demeaned. Hence, the dummies for unemployment and out of the labor force are relative to an employed person working the average number of hours. 23 I also stacked the data for the main respondent and the spouse, thus treating each as a separate observation in the regression. This yields essentially the same coefficients but the standard errors are smaller than those of the baseline regression.
specification 3, I try to get a more accurate estimate of the effect of own income by eliminating two other income proxies (home value and the dummy for renter) and by instrumenting log household income by the predicted household earnings, where the prediction based on the industry×occupation information of the respondent and the spouse and national earnings information (excluding the own state) by industry×occupation and time period from the CPS MORG. 24 Instrumenting results in an estimated effect of own household income on happiness that is about three times as large as the estimate in the baseline specification. Moreover, the estimate is now larger than the absolute value of the estimate of neighbors' earnings, though this difference is not statistically significant. The point estimates imply that if both own income and neighbors' earnings rise by the same percentage, a person would feel better off, indicating one's absolute economic situation matters for happiness in addition to one's relative position.
Could the results be spurious? Table 2 investigates whether selection or omitted area characteristics could be driving the results. The first row of Table 2 replicates the baseline regression.
The second row includes individual-specific fixed effects, thus controlling for all timeinvariant individual characteristics. The coefficient on neighbors' earnings remains negative and similar in magnitude though it is now only significant at the 10% level. This finding discounts the possibility that the cross-section results are driven by selection of people who are happier by nature into areas that are relatively poor. Of course, this specification does not rule out selection based on unobserved time-variant characteristics. The third row shows a regression that is identical to the baseline regression, except that a full set of state×wave fixed effects, a dummy for living in a metropolitan area and log metropolitan population size are added as controls.
Both the coefficients on neighbors' earnings and on own income change little and remain statistically significant. Hence, the results are driven by variation in neighbors' earnings within states at each point in time. This specification thus rules out that the baseline results are spurious due to unobserved variables that operate at the state level or above, such as a poorer (southern) states having happier residents on average, for example because of unobserved better weather.
One might worry that movers have something unobserved happen to them and that perhaps this unobserved factor causes the happiness to be inversely related to average neighbors' earnings.
The fourth row tests this by showing the baseline regression excluding all respondents who moved to a different PUMA. Again the coefficients on neighbors' earnings and own income are hardly affected, showing that the baseline results are not just driven by movers.
The regression in the fifth line is identical to the one in the fourth row, except that it includes individual fixed effects. Because the sample is limited to non-movers, the individual fixed effects also serve as PUMA fixed effects (i.e., any PUMA fixed effects would be absorbed by the individual fixed effects). Thus, the coefficient on neighbors' income in this regression is Unfortunately, the standard error in this specification is too large for this regression to provide any evidence on selection.
Could neighbors' earnings proxy for local price levels? In this case, the negative coefficient on neighbors' earnings would simply reflect that happiness falls as real incomes fall.
Recall that neighbors' earnings are measured by LnPumaEarnings, which is a predictor of local earnings based on the local industry×occupation mix but national earnings data (excluding data from one's own state). Hence, local price variation would only be picked up by
LnPumaEarnings to the extent it is correlated with the local industry×occupation mix.
Moreover, we saw in row 3 that the estimates are robust to the inclusion of state×wave fixed effects, implying that only local price variation within states at a point in time could possibly be driving the results. Since migration within states is relatively easy, one would wonder what the source of such price variation is. If higher prices merely reflect better local amenities (such as better schools or less crime), one shouldn't deflate incomes by local prices, because the higher local prices simply imply that one substitutes amenities for physical goods. Thus, in that case, higher local prices should not reduce well-being. On the other hand, if higher local prices reflect transportation costs or higher local production cost, local wages would need to rise proportionally to prevent an outflow of labor. In this case, individuals in an area with high local prices would earn more but not be any better off than similar individuals in an area with low local prices. Thus, if we don't measure a respondent's income by monetary variables (such as household income, home value) but instead use proxies that don't respond to local wage levels (national earnings in the respondent's industry ×occupation cell), then there would be no role for
LnPumaEarnings to serve as a control for local prices. Hence, the coefficient on
LnPumaEarnings should become insignificant if it were just spuriously picking up local price variation. The sixth row of table 2 estimates the baseline regression purged of any controls that proxy for the respondent's nominal income. The coefficient on LnPumaEarnings drops in size but remains negative and significant. This rules out that LnPumaEarnings is just picking up variation in local price levels. Table 3 investigates the robustness of the baseline results. The first row again reproduces the baseline regression. One might be concerned that the results are driven by the somewhat complicated procedure used to predict LnPumaEarnings. The second row alleviates this concern; if anything, the estimate on LnPumaEarnings becomes more negative and more significant if we replace the predicted value by the actual value in 1989. Similarly, the third row shows that using log PUMA income instead of earnings yields similar results. The fourth row runs the baseline regression on all the observations in the balanced panel (rather than only the ones married in both waves). The coefficient on neighbors' earnings remains highly significant, but drops somewhat in magnitude, giving a first indication that the estimates are primarily driven by the married subsample. This issue will be explored further in Table 7 , discussed below.
Could neighbors' earnings proxy for non-linearities in the effect of own income? This concern is ruled out by the fifth row, which shows that the estimate on neighbors' earnings hardly changes after the inclusion of a 5 th -order polynomial in log household income. Since the outcome variable, self-reported happiness, is ordinal rather than cardinal, an OLS regression may not be appropriate. Specification six estimates the baseline regression using an ordered Probit and finds that the coefficient on neighbors' earnings remains negative and highly significant. Moreover, the ratio of the coefficient on neighbors' earnings to the coefficient on own income remains roughly constant. 25 Finally, the seventh row shows that the results are insensitive to replacing log own household income by the couple's log total earnings.
Do neighbors' earnings affect other outcomes?
Could an increase in neighbors' earnings merely change what individuals define as happy rather than their true underlying well-being? This concern is hard to rule out definitively, but using other outcome measures that may be less prone to shifts in definition yields some insights.
The first specification in Table 4 The third specification in Table 4 considers a measure of depression, which is the sum of the 12 items of the Radloff depression scale that are included in both waves of the survey. Since many of the items have more of an absolute definition (e.g. "having a poor appetite," "sleeping restlessly") or at least a definition for which it might be hard to use neighbors' behavior as a reference, the depression scale may be less prone to shifting definitions. On the other hand, depression and well-being, though correlated, are two distinct concepts and it is very well possible that increases in neighbors' earnings reduce true well-being without increasing depression. As the regression shows, neighbors' earnings have no significant impact on the depression index. Because the depression index is quite skewed, I also looked at the effect of neighbors' earnings on the probability of being in each part of the distribution of depression index. As specification four shows, higher neighbors' earnings significantly increase the probability of being in the top four quintiles of the depression index but do not significantly affect the probability of being in the top three, top two or top quintile of the depression index.
Thus, the effect of neighbors' earnings seems to be limited to the bottom of the depression index distribution (i.e., only those furthest removed from being depressed come somewhat closer to being depressed). Overall, the findings with depression as an outcome variable only slightly alleviate concerns about shifting definitions of happiness, though depression might be a sufficiently different concept from well-being to pick up relative position effects.
27
Since a large literature examines the effect of relative position on health outcomes, the fifth specification uses self-reported health status (relative to one's age group) as an outcome measure. 28 I find no significant relation between average neighbors' earnings and self-reported health. This finding, of course, does not rule out that such a relationship might exist, but it does not show up using my baseline specification.
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Mechanisms behind the association between neighbors' earnings and happiness
One can think of overall self-reported happiness as being driven by one's satisfaction with various domains of life, such as one's family life, financial situation or friendships (Van Praag, Frijters and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2003) . Only in wave 2, the NSFH asks respondents to rate their satisfaction with 11 such domains on a 7-point scale. Table 5 shows a regression of self- 27 In their study of the randomized Moving to Opportunity experiment, Kling et al. (2004) find that individuals moving to lower poverty census tracts report lower levels of psychological distress. Thus, for mental health measures such as depression or psychological distress the benefits associated with richer areas (such as lower crime) apparently outweigh any relative position effect. reported happiness on these 11 measures of satisfaction (but no other controls) to give the reader a sense of the relative importance of these satisfaction components for self-reported happiness.
According to this regression, the top three predictors of self-reported happiness are satisfaction with family life, financial situation and sex life (in that order). Table 6 Even if status influences happiness, one would not expect it to affect happiness with aspects of life that are largely unaffected by comparisons with neighbors. Indeed, the remaining eight questions on life satisfaction cannot account for much of the relationship between neighbors' earnings and happiness, even though they include important general predictors of happiness such as satisfaction with family life and health (recall Table 5 ). 30 Even controlling for all eight simultaneously leaves the relationship between neighbors' earnings and happiness 30 One might have expected satisfaction with present job to be influenced by neighbors' earnings. Perhaps this question measures job aspects (such as corporate culture) that are less subject to comparison with neighbors.
significant at the 5% level. Thus it seems that, by and large, neighbors' earnings affect happiness primarily through those components of happiness for which one would expect relative earnings to matter most. earnings are all equal to each other cannot be rejected at the 10% level, there seems to be little or no effect of neighbors' earnings on happiness for never-married individuals or those experiencing marital status transitions. This is not surprising because these individuals are likely to be less settled and thus less inclined to consider their neighbors as their reference group.
Interaction effects
Might neighbors' earnings not matter by themselves but only affect people's happiness because they are correlated with the price of housing? In this case, we would expect to see a differential effect between renters (who dislike increases in the price of housing) and homeowners (most of whom like seeing the value of their home rise). Specification 5 shows that this is not the case. Or might neighbors' earnings somehow operate through the quality of schooling (e.g. richer neighbors leaving the public school system)? In this case, we should see different effects for those with and without children, which, as specification 6 shows, is not the case. Finally, specification 7 finds that the effect of neighbors' earnings seems to be somewhat stronger for relatively new residents (less than 7 years) than for longer-term residents, but the difference is not statistically significant. If the neighbors' earnings reduce self-reported happiness because people engage in social comparisons, we would expect a stronger effect for those with more contacts with their neighbors. 31 Looking at finer partitions of duration of residence did not reveal any interesting patterns. 32 I don't partition the happiness distribution at 3 and 2 because only 3.5% and 1.0% of the observations respectively report levels of happiness lower than these values. 33 The direct effect is positive in all cases but only significant for socializing with neighbors or relatives. Of course, the direct effect should not be interpreted causally.
PUMA residents with a college degree and for those without. 
Conclusion
This paper shows that individuals' self-reported happiness is negatively affected by the earnings of others in their area. By looking at alternative outcome measures, such as frequency of financial worries, I provide evidence that this finding is not simply an artifact of the way people report happiness. I investigate the concern that the finding could be driven by omitted variables, but find no evidence of selection in a number of specification tests. Though the mechanism by which increases in neighbors' earnings reduce happiness is hard to identify precisely, I provide suggestive evidence that interpersonal preferences are likely to be responsible for them. Increased neighbors' earnings by and large reduce satisfaction with material (rather than immaterial) aspects of one's life and have the strongest negative effect on happiness for those who socialize more in their neighborhood. I therefore conclude that the negative effect of neighbors' earnings on well-being is real and that it is most likely caused by a psychological externality, i.e. people having utility functions that depend on relative consumption in addition to absolute consumption.
The size of the effect is economically meaningful. An increase in neighbors' earnings and a similarly sized decrease in own income each have roughly about the same negative effect on well-being. This suggests that an increase in own income leads to a negative externality on neighbors' well-being that is of the same order of magnitude as the positive effects on own wellbeing. Unless one chooses to disallow these negative externalities on the ground that they appear to stem from an interpersonal preference component that is morally questionable, externalities of this size can in principle substantially affect the optimal policies dealing with income taxation, consumption taxation and residential sorting.
Appendices:
Appendix A: Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics
The baseline sample consists of individuals who are married or cohabitating in both waves of the NSFH and have non-missing information on own household income. Unless otherwise noted, the variables in the baseline sample consist of the average of the non-missing values of that variable for the main respondent and his or her spouse. All dollar amounts are converted to 1982-84 real dollars using the CPI-U from Bureau of Labor Statistics. Log household total pre-tax income constructed by the NSFH using information from both the main respondent and his or her spouse. NSFH variable names: "IHTOT2" in wave 1 and "MUHHTOT" in wave 2.
Ln Predicted earnings of R and spouse
Log pre-tax earnings of the main respondent and his/her spouse based on the industry×occupation codes of the respondent and the spouse and the earnings by industry×occupation×time-period from the CPS MORG. See Appendix B for details.
Ln Actual earnings of R and spouse
Log pre-tax earnings of the main respondent and his/her spouse.
Ln Value of home
Log current value of the respondent's home if the respondent is a homeowner.
Answer to the question "How much do you think your home would sell for now?". Renter
Dummy for renting one's home.
Ln Usual working hours
Log total usual working hours in one's main and secondary job. Non-working individuals are assigned the mean log working hours to make the dummies for unemployment and not-in-the-labor force more easily interpretable.
Unemployed
Dummy for being unemployed defined as not currently employed and having looked for work during the past 4 weeks.
Not in the labor force
Dummy for those neither currently employed nor unemployed. Non-Hispanic white; Black; Hispanic; Asian; Other race or race n/a Answer to the question "Which of the groups on this card best describes you? Chicano, Mexicano; . Categories 3,4,5 and 6 are combined into "Hispanic" and categories 7,9 and no answer are combined into "Other race or race n/a". Married of days) ." The answer to each question is the number of days (0-7) on which the condition applied. The depression index is the sum of the answers to these 12 questions. This variable is only based on the responses by the main respondent because the depression items were not asked of the spouse in the first wave.
Self-reported health status
The 
Appendix B: Construction of Predictor for PUMA-and Industry×Occupation Earnings
This appendix provides a detailed description of the construction of both the PUMA-level earnings predictor and the predictor of average earnings at the industry×occupation level. The construction of these predictors is described in seven steps.
Step 1: Creation of a common set of industry×occupation codes
The industry and occupation codes in the first wave of the NSFH as well as in the 1987 and 1988 CPS MORG files are 3-digit 1980 Census codes, while 3-digit 1990 Census codes were used in the second NSFH wave, the 1992-1994 CPS MORG files and (obviously) the 1990 Census PUMS. I create a crosswalk to make these two sets of codes compatible. In general, the 1980 and 1990 Census industry and occupation classification is very similar. In a few cases, I need to merge several 3-digit occupations or industries together in order to make the codes comparable. I exclude the active-duty military. The crosswalk transforms 231 industry codes from the 1980 Census and 236 industry codes from the 1990 Census into a set of 225 unique and comparable industry codes. Similarly, it transforms 503 occupation codes from the 1980 Census and 501 occupation codes from the 1990 Census into a set of 496 unique and comparable occupation codes.
Step 2: Calculation of average industry×occupation×time-period earnings from CPS MORG:
I use the NBER CPS labor abstracts to obtain usual weekly earnings ("earnwke") by industry×occupation for the years 1987-88 and 1992-94 for all employees (self-employed individuals are excluded because their earnings data is often unreliable). To ensure compatibility over time, all earnings are deflated by the 1982-84 CPI-U, all topcoded earnings are replaced by twice the value of the topcode 35 , and the sum of weights is made identical across years.
Step 2 yields two variables: LnEarn 1 , average log annual earnings by industry×occupation cell in 1987-1988, and LnEarn 2 , average log annual earnings by industry×occupation cell in 1992-1994. These variables differ by state because data from the own state is excluded in calculating the average.
Step 3: Prediction of average earnings by industry×occupation×time-period cell Because many industry×occupation cells have very few observations or are empty in the CPS data but are non-empty in the NSFH or Census PUMS, I use a linear regression to predict earnings in each industry×occupation cell in each time period. I regress LnEarn 1 on a full set of 3-digit industry dummies and a full set of 3-digit occupation dummies where each industry×occupation cell is weighted by the weighted number of observation in that cell in the MORG. I run this regression separately for each state (because of the exclusion of the own state information). On average, these regressions have about 20,000 observations. The regressions yield the earnings predictor LnEarnPred 1 . Similar regressions for wave 2 yield the earnings predictor LnEarnPred 2 .
Step 4: Taking a weighted average between actual and predicted earnings
The benefit of the predictor described in step 3 is that it yields predicted earnings for industry×occupation×time-period cells that are empty in the CPS MORG and that it increases the precision of the earnings estimate for industry×occupation×time-period cells with very few observations (in wave 1 (2), 75% of the industry×occupation cells have 8 (9) or fewer observations in them). However, by not allowing industry×occupation interactions, the regression may not be the best predictor of earnings for cells with a large number of observations. To balance these two concerns, I take a weighted average, LnEarnHat t , between predicted earnings and actual earnings, where the weight depends on n, the number of observations in that cell. Specifically, for wave 1:
and similarly for wave 2. The parameter, eff t n or the relative weight on predicted earnings is estimated by a non-linear least squares regression of log average earnings from the PUMS on the left hand side of the equation above, where industry×occupation cells are weighted by the weighted number of observations in them in the PUMS. This yields n eff of 22.9 and 25.1 for wave 1 and wave 2 respectively. The R 2 of these regressions are 0.74 and 73 respectively. The variable LnEarnHat t is merged to the NSFH data (based on the wave of the survey and the respondent's industry, occupation and state) and is the instrument for own household income used in specification 3 of table 1.
Step 6: Prediction of PUMA-level earnings Using data from the 1990 Census 5% PUMS, I assign to each non-institutionalized person aged 16-65 the level of the predicted earnings, exp(LnEarnHat), based on that person's industry, occupation and state. I do this both for predicted earnings in 1987-88 and in 1992-94. Next, I calculate the average predicted level of earnings for each PUMA for each time period. The log of the average predicted level of earnings for each time period and PUMA is the variable LnPumaPred.
Step 7: Rescaling of LnPumaPred t
To test the predictive power of LnPumaPred t , I regress both LnPumaPred 1 and LnPumaPred 2 on log actual PUMA-level earnings in 1989 (from the 1990 Census) for the sample of 1315 PUMAs that occur in the NSFH data.
36 Though both regressions have a high R 2 (0.846 and 0.861 respectively), the coefficient on log actual 1989 PUMA level earnings is only around a half. Thus, while the predictor apparently does a good job ranking PUMAs by earnings, it underestimates earnings differences. To correct for this underprediction, I multiply each predictor by 2.19. After this rescaling, a regression of the average of LnPumaPred 1 and LnPumaPred 2 on log actual PUMA-level earnings in 1989 yields a coefficient of exactly one. This rescaling reduces the coefficient on PUMA-level earnings as an independent variable by a factor of about two but it of course does not affect the statistical significance of any of the results in the paper. In the rest of the paper, I refer to the rescaled predictor of PUMA-level earnings as Ln Puma Earnings (predicted) or, when there is no risk of confusion, Ln Puma Earnings for short.
Validation using NSFH data As a check on both the PUMA-level and industry×occupation-level predictors of earnings, I regress log earnings of NSFH respondents (with earnings of at least $100/year) on these predictors. The first row shows that the predictor of PUMA level earnings is highly significant, has a coefficient of about 0.75 and explains about 3.5% of the individual-level earnings variation. The second row shows that results are similar if we use the log of average actual earnings in the PUMA of the respondent in 1989. This shows that the use of predicted rather than actual earnings does not entail a huge loss of predictive power. The third, fourth and fifth row show that the results are similar for each wave and hold up if state fixed effects are included.
Rows (6) through (10), repeat these checks for the measure of industry × occupation earnings constructed in step 5 above. This measure is highly significant and has a coefficient reasonably close to one in all cases. Row (7) shows that results remain similar if we instead use log average earnings in 1989 by industry×occupation cell from the 1990 Census. This confirms that results are not driven by any peculiarities of my procedure of creating the measure for industry×occupation earnings. (1)- (5), standard errors are corrected for clustering at the PUMA level while in specifications (6)-(10) they are adjusted for clustering at the industry × occupation level. Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on PUMAs (1000 clusters in specifications 1 and 3; 974 clusters in specification 2). Ln usual hours and Ln home value are demeaned. All regressions also include dummy variables for independent variables with missing values. Selfreported happiness is measured on a scale of 1 to 7, with 7 representing "very happy." The sample consists of respondents of NSFH waves 1 and 2 that are married or cohabiting in both waves. In specifications (1) and (3) the variables are the average of the respondent's value and that of his or her spouse. In specification (3), ln household income is instrumented by predicted ln household earnings where predicted earnings are based on the industry × occupation of the respondent and his or her spouse. Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the PUMA level. All regressions include the same controls as the baseline regression reported in table 1, column 1 except for the regressions in specification 2, which also control for self-reported quality of relationship with spouse. The variable Financial worries exists only in wave 2 and is the answer to the question "How often do you worry that your total family income will not be enough to meet your family's expenses and bills?" where 1 corresponds to "never" and 5 to "almost all the time." The frequency of open disagreements is measured on a scale of 1 ("never") to 6 ("almost every day"). The depression index is the sum of the 12 Radloff items that appear in both waves of the NSFH. Each item is the number of days in the past week that the respondent felt or experienced a symptom related to depression. Examples of such symptoms are "sleeping restlessly," "talking less than usual," and "feeling sad." Self-reported health status is the answer to the question "Compared with other people your age, how would you describe your health?", where 1 corresponds to "very poor" and 5 to "excellent." Specifications 3 and 4 only use data from the main respondent because the depression questions were only asked of the main respondent in all waves. Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the PUMA level. Not reported but included in the regression are dummies variables for missing values of the satisfaction questions. The satisfaction variables are answers to the question; "Overall, how satisfied are you with... X," where X is "your family life," "your financial situation," etc. The answers are recorded on a 7-point scale with 1 corresponding to "very dissatisfied" and 7 corresponding to "very satisfied". Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the PUMA level. Each specification is a single OLS regression in which Ln PUMA earnings and Ln household income are interacted with an exhaustive set of dummies. All regressions also include as controls the uninteracted set of dummy variables as well as the same controls as the baseline regression reported in table 1, column 1. Except for specification (4), the baseline sample consisting of individuals married or cohabiting in both waves is used. In specification (1) only information from the main respondent is used (because there is virtually no variation in the average gender of couples). In specification (4), no interactions with PUMA earnings or own household income are included for 2 observations with missing marital status transitions. The hypothesis that the coefficients on Ln PUMA earnings are all equal to each other cannot be rejected at a significance level of 0.10 or lower for any of the specifications. The number of observations in each category is denoted between square brackets. Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the PUMA level. Each specification is a single OLS regression in which Ln PUMA earnings and Ln household income are interacted with an exhaustive set of dummies. All regressions also include as controls the uninteracted set of dummy variables as well as the same controls as the baseline regression reported in table 1, column 1. In wave 1, respondents were asked how often they "spend a social evening" with various types of people while in wave 2 they were asked how often they "get together socially" with these types of people. The number of observations in each category is denoted between square brackets. Frequency of social contacts is the frequency of social contacts of the main respondent because this variable was not collected of spouses in both waves. Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the PUMA level. All regressions also include as controls the uninteracted variables as well as the same controls as the baseline regression reported in table 1, column 1. The sample is limited to the baseline sample for which the respondent and his or her spouse both have non-missing values for educational attainment.
